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                              UNREPORTED    NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                      FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                          _____________ 
 
                           No. 00-3297 
                          _____________ 
 
          RAYMOND T. PRYER 
 
               v. 
 
          C.O. 3 SLAVIC; C.O. 1 COOK; C.O. 1 D. BURSEY, 
 
                              Appellants 
                          _____________ 
 
           Appeal from the United States District Court 
             for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
                     (D.C. Civ. No. 92-1461) 
           District Judge: Honorable Gary L. Lancaster 
                          _____________ 
 
                              Argued 
                         October 26, 2000 
      Before: MANSMANN, ALITO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
                                  
 
                          _____________ 
 
                      ORDER AMENDING OPINION 
                          _____________ 
 
          The opinion filed on May 30, 2001 is amended as follows: 
          Page 18, line 2   delete the word "effectively"; 
          Page 18, insert the following paragraphs before the paragraph 
beginning 
"Rather than reversing . . . . 
                         The majority seeks to justify its departure from 
our 
          established standard of review, and its consequent substitution 
          of its discretion for that of the trial judge, by invoking two 
          purported exceptions: First, the majority asserts that no 
          deference is due "where a trial court fails to explain its 
          grounds for exercising discretion, and its reasons for doing so 
          are not otherwise apparent from the record".  Supra at 7 n.4.  
          However, the District Court's reasons for limiting the second 
          trial to damages are made abundantly clear in its opinion: As 
          the Court explained, "a new trial is appropriate on the issue of 
          damages because the court failed to properly instruct the jury 
          on damages" (by, inter alia, giving an unwarranted nominal 
          damages instruction), and because the resulting nominal 
          damages award was against the weight of the evidence.  
          Implicit in the Court's recital of errors in the damages 
          instructions and award was its recognition that there was no 
          error in the liability instructions or verdict.  Ordinarily, the 
          presence of error limited to a single issue should be 
          considered reason enough to limit retrial to that issue.  
          Although the majority may consider the stated reasons 
          insufficient, it cannot fairly be said that the trial Court 
          "articulated no rationale". 
                         Second, the majority asserts that the District 
Court's 
          grant of a partial retrial "turns on the application of a legal 
          precept to the evidence".  Supra at 7 n.4.  The majority does 
          not identify what "legal precept" it deems controlling.  The 
          due process and fairness concerns set forth in Gasoline 
          Products clearly speaks to discretion, and we (and other 
          courts) have always considered its application to be an 
          exercise of discretion, rather than a legal determination.  The 
          majority's cryptic invocation of the "legal precept" exception, 
          without identifying a controlling question of law, threatens to 
          eviscerate the abuse of discretion standard: potentially, every 
          exercise of discretion may be subjected to plenary review at 
          the whim of the reviewing court by pointing out that some 
          "legal precept" is somehow involved.  By substituting its 
          judgment for that of the District Court (in which the discretion 
          is intended to be reposed) on the basis of such ill-considered, 
          amorphous exceptions, the majority has fundamentally altered 
          our standard of review, effectively overruling sub silentio our 
          decisions in Vizzini and Stanton. 
 
          Page 19, line 2   delete "finding an abuse of discretion by" and 
substitute 
"overriding" 
 
          Page 19, line 3   after Court add "'s discretion" 
 
          IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
 
 
 
                                                            /s/ Carol Los 
Mansmann                       
                                          Circuit Judge 
 
          Dated:    June 5, 2001 
